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the cyclical properties of job 
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t, a 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A number of empirical papers suggest that cross country dierences in job dynamics and
employment may be related to institutional dierences by generating distinct responses to
similar shocks (see for instance Nickell [18], Blanchard and Wolfers [4], Bertola et al. [3]). It
is also now well-known that there is no simple relationship between the dynamic behavior of
the labor market and the aggregate unemployment level. Unemployment rates are typically
higher in Europe than in the US, although job turnover rates, the sum of the job destruction
and the job creation rates, look fairly similar (see OECD [19] and [20]). The institutional
features emphasized by the literature as most important for aggregate employment perfor-
mance are the generosity of the unemployment insurance system and the characteristics
of the wage negotiation process. Employment protection measures have no clear eect on
aggregate employment, although they may obviously aect the job reallocation process.
In theoretical literature, much eort has been devoted to investigate the behaviors and
mechanisms able to explain these empirical ndings by relying on models with endogenous
job creation and destruction (see Mortensen and Pissarides [16]). In this framework, un-
employment benets aect positively the worker's bargaining position and therefore the
negotiated wages. The eect on employment is hence negative1. Employment protection
unambiguously limits job destruction but also job creation, so that the net eect on total
employment is a priori ambiguous. However, in most of the calibrated models, a positive
relationship is often found (see Mortensen and Pissarides [17] or Ljungqvist [14]). A much
less analyzed issue is the eect of wage rigidities on job 
ows. An exception is Cahuc and
Zylberberg [7] who investigate the interaction between job protection and minimum wage
restrictions. They start from a standard model where, with freely negotiated wages, ring
costs have a positive impact on employment, as in Mortensen and Pissarides [17]. They
show that this conclusion can be reversed when wages negotiations are constrained by a
minimum wage rule.
Our objective is to build on these previous works and look more closely at the combined
eects of three institutional characteristics of the labor market: unemployment benets,
employment protection and wage rigidities. We build to that end a stochastic intertemporal
1See for instance Holmlund [12] for a survey on unemployment benets.
2general equilibrium model with search unemployment and endogenous job turnover. This
gives us the mean to examine the eects of these institutional variables, on both the station-
ary state values of unemployment and job 
ows and on their cyclical properties. Looking at
cyclical properties gives additional information about the combined eects of institutional
variables and about their role in explaining the similarities and dierences between the US
and a typical European country. Garibaldi [11] studies the eects of institutions on the
cyclical properties of job 
ows. However, he does not introduce capital accumulation and he
only assumes three possible aggregate states (bad, medium and good) for his economy. He
moreover solely focuses on employment protection (through 
ows of ring permissions). Our
starting point is Den Haan et al. [10], who insert the Mortensen and Pissarides [16]'s model
into an intertemporal general equilibrium model, with endogenous interest rates and capital
accumulation. One can in this way capture the interactions between capital accumulation
and job destruction. The model also distinguishes two types of shocks, an autoregressive
aggregate productivity shock and a job specic idiosyncratic productivity shock, so as to be
able to examine both the cyclical and the stationary state properties of the economy. In our
paper, we complete this framework by introducing the three above-mentioned labor market
institutions. Unemployment benets are exogenous and employment protection takes the
form of a ring tax. The downward wage rigidity is modelled as a lower bound on the out-
come of wage negotiations: wages are renegotiated "at will" according to a Nash bargaining
rule as long as they remain above this institutionally determined lower bound2.
The model is calibrated so as to reproduce the main characteristics of an "average" EU
economy3, in terms of unemployment rate and job 
ows levels and volatilities. The model
so calibrated yields a procyclical job creation rate, a countercyclical job destruction rate and
a weakly countercyclical job turnover. The calibrated model is next used as a benchmark
to evaluate the role played by each of our institutional variables. Unemployment benets
have a sizeable eect on the unemployment rate, not so much though as the wage rigidity.
2Wage rigidities may take much more subtle forms and be much more pervasive than "minimum wage"
restrictions (see Cahuc and Zylberberg [7] for a more elaborated representation of downward wage rigidities).
However, as these authors, we will refer throughout the paper to the lower bound of the wage distribution
as a minimum wage, keeping in mind that it is not associated with the worker productive characteristic.
Indeed, all individuals in our model strictly have the same skills and only jobs productivity diers.
3Except UK which do not share many labor market characteristics of most continental European countries.
3As in Cahuc and Zylberberg [7], the eect of employment protection depends on the level
of the wage rigidities. Low rigidities are associated with a positive eect of the ring tax on
employment while high rigidities are associated with a negative eect. However, whatever
the rigidities, the quantitative eect of employment protection is weak. We also obtain
that changes in the wage rigidity and in the ring tax have opposite eects on the cyclical
properties of job 
ows, while changes in the unemployment benet have almost no eects.
A wage rigidity decreases the relative job destruction rate volatility (with respect to the
job creation rate volatility) and decreases the countercyclicality of the job turnover. This
suggests that downward wage rigidities, rather than unemployment benet and employment
protection, may well play a dominant role in explaining the dierences between the US
and the EU economies, both in terms of equilibrium unemployment rate and of the cyclical
properties of job 
ows.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we summarize some key
empirical ndings about the working of labor market, in OECD countries, and we give some
estimates of the relative importance of unemployment benets, job protection and wage
rigidities. In section 3, we present our theoretical framework. The model is then calibrated
in section 4 and simulated in section 5 to provide a quantitative assessment of the eects of
our institutional variables on the steady state and the cyclical properties. The last section
concludes.
2 Labor market 
ows and institutions: some stylized
facts
In this section, we brie
y report some empirical evidences about labor market 
ows and
institutional characteristics for several OECD countries.
2.1 Job turnover and unemployment
Many contributions have attempted to assess the cyclical behavior of labor market 
ows
in order to highlight the dierences or similarities between European and North American
countries. A particular attention has then been devoted to the job turnover rate (JT),
4the sum of job creation (JC) and job destruction rates (JD), and its correlation with net
employment changes4.
An important feature regarding job 
ows dynamics is that, in most OECD countries, the
job turnover is relatively high, between 15% and 25% (see second column of table 1). This
observation is more striking if we consider the third column of table 1, which provides the
net employment change rate (NET), dened simply as the dierence between JC and JD5.
It turns out indeed that a slightly positive net employment change is associated with a very
large job reallocation. If a high average level of job turnover is a common feature of most
OECD countries, we nevertheless observe dierences across countries in the job turnover
cyclical properties. Looking at the fourth and fth columns, we notice that in the US, the
JD rate is more volatile than the JC rate. On the other hand, in the EU, the volatilities of
the JD rate and the JC rate are quite close (see column 6).
Another well known empirical nding is that, generally, job creation is procyclical while job
destruction is countercyclical. It indeed seems intuitive enough to have more (resp. less)
job creations and less (resp. more) job destructions during economic expansion (recession).
A much more open and debated question concerns the cyclicality of job turnover. This
has been sudied by several authors6 but with sometimes quite dierent results given the
data and the methodology used. The OECD [19] proposes a summary of these studies and
it usually turns out that in the US, the job turnover is negatively correlated with the net
employment change rate, whereas in the EU, the correlation seems to be much less negative7.
Consequently, in the US, the level of job reallocation is higher during a recession, while in the
UE, it is quite constant over the cycle. It is worth noting that this observation is consistent
with the more important job destruction volatility in the US. Eventually, as displayed in the
last column of table 1, the unemployment rate is lower in the US than in the EU.
4Due to a lack of quarterly data (especially for European countries), all gures presented in this section
are annual data.
5See OECD [19] for extensive denitions of these concepts.
6See, among others, Davis et al. [9] for the US and Boeri [5] for some OECD countries.
7NET is taken as a measure of the cycle in empirical papers. Data are also HP ltered.
52.2 Labor market institutions
In table 2, we provide for several OECD countries some measures of three policy instru-
ments that we will study in our theoretical model: unemployment insurance, employment
protection and wage rigidities. The simultaneous use of these instruments is often regarded
as a signicant factor to explain the weak performance (in term of employment) of European
labor markets.
Using dierent unemployment durations (from 1 to 5 years) and dierent marital status
(single, couple without children, couple with two children), the OECD [24] computes a
synthetical net replacement ratio for 1999. This statistics (second column of table 2) is twice
higher in most EU countries8 than in the US. This underlines the relative generosity of the
unemployment benets in the EU countries (or the tightness in the US). In the same way,
the OECD [23] computes a synthetical index of the strictness of the employment protection
legislation for the end 1990's. This indicator (rst gure of the third column) includes regular
and temporary contracts and takes into account the regular procedural inconveniences, the
notice and severance pay for no-fault individual dismissals and the diculty of dismissal.
A low (resp. high) index means a low (resp. high) protection of employment. The OECD
also ranks the 26 countries surveyed from the country with the less strict protection (rank
1) to the country with the strictest protection (rank 26). This ranking is given between
parentheses in the third column. We again observe a sharp dierence between the EU
(with strong employment protection) and the US (with almost no employment protection)
situations. Eventually, we reproduce in the fourth column of table 2 the gross Kaitz index
given by the OECD [22] for the year 1997. The Kaitz index is here dened as the ratio
between the minimum wage and the gross full-time mean earnings. This Kaitz index is over
0.50 for the EU countries whereas it is of only 0.35 for the US. Another way to illustrate the
rigidities of the EU wages is to look at the ratio between the highest and the lowest wages.
The last column of table 2 gives the D9/D1 ratio9 (see OECD [21]). The obvious conclusion
is that the wage dispersion is substantially lower in EU countries. This may be the result
8The replacement ratio in Italy is quite low and even lower than in the US. This ratio however rapidly
increases over time.
9D1 and D9 refer to the upper earnings limits of, respectively, the rst and the ninth deciles of employees
ranked in order of their gross earning from lowest to highest.
6of downward wage rigidities induced by minimum wage legislation, collective agreements
negotiated by more powerful trade unions,...
3 Model
To formalize the economy, we start from the Pierrard and Sneessens [25] two-tier productive
structure by assuming the coexistence of three types of agents in the economy: intermedi-
ate rms, a representative nal rm and a representative household10. Intermediate rms
require one worker to produce x units of intermediate good. As in Mortensen and Pis-
sarides [16], x is a random job-specic productivity parameter drawn each period from a
general cumulative distribution function F 11. The nal rm uses intermediate goods as well
as capital to produce an homogeneous nal good that can be either consumed or invested by
the household. This representative household supplies labor to intermediate rms and cap-
ital to the nal rm. We then have three types of markets for respectively labor, goods and
capital. We use a standard matching function to represent the frictions on the labor market.
The household search eort is endogenous, as well as the job creation and destruction rates.
The nal good is taken as the numeraire. Perfect competition prevails on both goods and
capital market. Finally, the wages are negotiated between the intermediate rms and the
household. There is however an institutionally xed lower bound wage binding downward
the negotiation results (downward wage rigidity). We also introduce unemployment benets
and employment protection.
10We could equivalently assume, as in den Haan et al. [10], a "one-tier" production structure with only
single job rms with labor but also capital as input. Our two-tier structure (intermediate and nal rms)
however allows a simpler presentation.
11The assumption that the idiosyncratic shock arrival rate is equal to 1 (as for instance in den Haan et
al. [10]) greatly simplies our model. Introducing some persistence for these shocks would indeed necessitate
to use a discrete aggregate productivity shock (see Mortensen and Pissarides [17] or Garibaldi [11] for such
aggregate productivity shock) rather than the usual specication used in Real Business Cycle models (see
equation (43)).
73.1 Labor market 
ows
We assume that the total labor force is constant and normalized to 1, with Nt employed
workers and Ut unemployed workers:
1 = Nt + Ut: (1)
At each period, the number Mt of new employer-worker contacts is function of the stock
Vt of vacancies and of the number of ecient job seekers, i.e. the number of unemployed
weighted by a function S of their search eort St. More formally:
Mt = M(Vt;S(St)Ut); (2)
where the matching function M is increasing, concave in its arguments and M(0;:) =
M(:;0) = 0. The function S is increasing, concave and 0  St. The probability for a rm
with a vacancy to meet a job seeker is qt and the probability for a job seeker to meet a








It is worth noting that all contacts will not lead to job creation because some matches may
turn out not to be productive enough. The productivity x of a new match is only revealed
after the contact and may be too low to generate a positive surplus. The endogenous
destruction rate of the new contacts will be denoted 0
t, whereas the endogenous destruction
rate of existing jobs is 1
t. As we will see later, the dierence between these two rates arises
from the fact that only existing jobs are institutionally protected. Total employment is
therefore the sum over two dierent types of jobs: "new jobs" (new contacts not destroyed)
denoted by the superscript j = 0 and "old jobs" (existing jobs not destroyed) denoted by the
superscript j = 1. The dynamics of total employment is given by the following equations,
respectively in terms of vacancies and job seekers' search eort:
Nt+1 = N0
t+1 + N1
t+1 = (1   0
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As explained before, a new contact at time t will lead to job creation at time t+1 if hit by an
idiosyncratic productivity shock higher both than the reservation productivity R
F;0
t+1 for the
intermediate rm and R
H;0
t+1 for the household. The reservation productivity of the economy





t+1g and the asset value of an intermediate rm
with a vacancy, W V
t , is:
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a is the cost of opening a vacancy, ~ t is the discount variable for future prots (dened in the
next section) and W
F;0
t is the asset value of a new job. The asset value of an intermediate
rm with a job of type j 2 f0;1g and with a productivity x is:
W
F;j

















dt is the unit price of the intermediate goods, f the ring tax, R1
t the economy reservation







t(x) the wage. For the moment,
we suppose a completely general wage formation mechanism w
j
t : < ! < : x   w
j
t(x). We
will see in section 3.5 how we introduce the wage bargaining with the downward wage





t (x) comes from the fact that w0
t(x) 6= w1
t(x) for given x. This is, in turn, due to
the fact that new contacts are not protected by a ring tax12. The reservation productivity
R
F;0





t ) = 0: (8)
12Mortensen and Pissarides [16] assume that a new job always starts at the highest available productivity
and is therefore never severed during the rst period. As pointed by Caballero and Hammour [6], this
assumption is particularly suitable for growth models with creative destruction.
9However, the rms with an old job have to pay a ring tax if the match is severed and their
reservation productivity R
F;1





t ) + f = 0: (9)
Finally, applying the free entry hypothesis, we also have at the equilibrium:
W V
t = 0: (10)
3.3 Household
Let the representative household's asset value be represented by the following function of
the household's three state variables14:
W H
t = W H(Kt;N0
t ;N1
t ); (11)











Ct is consumption, U is an increasing and concave utility function, DS and DN are increasing
and convex disutility functions (respectively of search and work) and  is the discount














the household's budget constraint then writes15:
Ct = t + wuUt +  w0
tN0
t +  w1
tN1
t + (rt + )Kt   (Kt+1   (1   )Kt)   Tt: (14)
The prots redistributed by the intermediate rms (value added net of labor, ring and
vacancy costs) are represented by t, wu stands for the unemployment insurance,  is the









t (x) = W
F;1
t (x).
14As usual in most of the related literature, we assume a perfect insurance mechanism between the members
of the household.
15As stated in Ljungqvist [14], severance payments can be oset by ecient labor contracts and have
therefore no eects. It is why we rather focus here on a ring tax which is hence not paid to the laid o
worker.
10capital depreciation rate and Tt is a lump sum tax levied to nance the unemployment
insurance. The optimization equation (12) is subject to the budget constraint (14) and
















UCt is the rst derivative of U with respect to Ct, DS
St the rst derivative of DS with respect




of working on a job of


























is the rst derivative of DN with respect to a job of type j.
For the household, the reservation productivity R
H;j







t ) = 0: (18)







t g, then the job destruction rate 
j
t for a job of type j is F(R
j
t).
Moreover, taking into account that the rms are owned by the household, we are now able
to dene the discount parameter for the future prots:






3.4 Representative nal rm
Let the asset value of the representative nal rm be:
W R
t = W R(Kt); (20)











11where F is an increasing and concave in its arguments production function which moreover
satises F(0;:) = F(:;0) = 0. The rst order optimality conditions can then be written as
follows:
FKt = rt + ; (22)
FQt = dt: (23)


















As usual, we assume that, at each period, wages are (re)negotiated between the rms and
the representative household. These bargained wages can be determined by a fairly standard
Nash product problem. The wage w
b;0



















while the wage w
b;1



















In both equations,  represents the household's bargaining power. Using equations (6)
to (10), equations (15) to (18) and the denition of R
j
t, bargained wages can be rewritten
in the general form:
w
b;j







However, we introduce a wage rigidity in our economy in a sense that our negotiated wages
are bounded downwards. If the wage w
b;j
t solving equation (25) or (26) is below a lower
bound wm, then the rm must pay this lower bound. The critical productivity value Q
j
t








t) = wm: (28)
















and the bargained wage equation (27) can be rewritten in:
w
b;j
t (x) = (x   Q
j
t)dt + wm: (30)
From this equation, it is immediate that the lower bound of the wage distribution wm has
a direct positive eect on the bargained wages, but also an indirect negative eect via an
increase in the critical value Q
j
t.
Using some arithmetic, we can derive some analytical properties. Firstly, it is easy to check
that without a wage rigidity, i.e. when wm is not binding, the decision to stop a match is












On the other hand, if some wages are bounded downwards, the decision to stop a match is

















t and the bargained wages w
b;j













t (x)   w
b;0
t (x) = f: (33)
As expected, we obtain that the ring tax increases the dierence both between the two job
destruction rates and the two wages. Moreover the distance between Rt and Qt is identical
in new rms and old rms.
3.6 Equilibrium
Given initial conditions K0, N0
0 and N1
































 given a vector of prices fPtg1
t=0, fQF
t g1
t=0 is solution to the intermediate rms problem
(equations (8), (9) and (10))
 given a vector of prices fPtg1
t=0, fQH
t g1
t=0 is solution to the household's problem
(equations (12) and (18))
 given a vector of prices fPtg1
t=0, fQR
t g1
t=0 is solution to the nal rm problem (equa-
tion (21))
 given a vector of quantities fQtg1
t=0, fPtg1
t=0 clears the capital and the goods markets
(equations (14) and (24))
 wages are set according to the wage determination mechanism (equations (25), (26)
and (29))
4 Calibration
To evaluate the quantitative eects of institutions on the behavior of the labor market,
the model, in quarterly data, will be rst calibrated at the steady state. We base our
calibration on Mortensen and Pissarides [17]16 and the empirical facts presented in section 2
to reproduce a representative EU labor market. We adopt the following specic functions:
F(K;Q) =  " (K)(Q)1 ; (34)
U(C) = ln(C); (35)
M(V;S(S)U) =  m (V )(S(S)U)1 ; (36)




























16They calibrate their model to represent the European employment experience over the last 20 years, in
quarterly data.
14The production function F is Cobb-Douglas with constant returns to scale, where  " is
an aggregate productivity parameter and  is the capital-output elasticity; and the utility
function U is logarithmic. As in Mortensen and Pissarides [17], the matching process M is
represented by a Cobb-Douglas function with constant returns to scale.  m is the exogenous
matching eciency and  is the elasticity of matches with respect to the vacancies. The
search eciency function S is concave whereas the disutility functions DS and DN are
convex.
The depreciation rate  of capital is set at 2.5% while the psychological discount factor  is
0.99, implying an annual interest rate of 4%. The aggregate productivity shock is normalized
to 1, and  = 0:33 to have a capital-output ratio of about 9. In the literature, estimations of
the matching function for European countries generally exhibit high elasticities of matches
with respect to unemployment, in the range of 0.5-0.7 (see for instance Pissarides and Petron-
golo [26]). We choose an intermediate value 1  = 0:6. The household's bargaining power
is set equal to the workers' parameter of the matching function, i.e.  = 1   17. The cost
of keeping a vacancy open is usually estimated to be small. Using a representative sample
of French establishments, Abowd and Kramarz [1] estimate an average hiring cost per hire
equivalent to 3.25% of the annual gross labor cost. If compared to the net labor cost (as in
our model), this ratio will however be substantially higher. We x a = 0:2 which gives a
ratio between hiring cost per hire and annual average wage of around 7%, a gure similar
to Mortensen and Pissarides [17].
Table 2 shows that the net replacement ratio is higher than 0.50 in most EU countries. This
ratio must nevertheless be seen as an upper bound since it does not account for eligibility
criteria and the very long unemployment spell duration. In our model, we x the replacement
ratio to 0.43 which gives an unemployment benet wu = 0:44. The cost arising from
employment protection is also expected to be high in EU countries but is more dicult to
estimate. In our model, f is a ring tax (which encompasses the cost of administrative
procedurals, of social protests,...) rather than a severance payment. We therefore follow
Mortensen and Pissarides [17] who estimate this cost to be about three times as large as
17See for instance Andolfatto [2] and Mertz [15] for a similar assumption. Their motivation is that this
so-called Hosios condition implies, in their simpler model, a competitive equilibrium of the decentralized
economy equivalent to the equilibrium of the social planner's problem.
15the cost of keeping a vacancy open and we set f = 0:50. We do not have direct data about
wage rigidities but a good proxy is the level of the minimum wage. Table 2 reports a gross
Kaitz index above 0.50 in the EU countries. The net Kaitz index is therefore higher and
we x it to 0.58 in our model leading to a minimum wage level wm = 0:6. This minimum
wage furthermore allows us to have 14% of the employed paid at the minimum wage (the
OECD [22] reports for instance a gure of 11% for France in 1996) and a D9/D1 ratio of
2.5, which seems realistic enough.
Following Mortensen and Pissarides [17], we simply assume a uniform distribution for the
idiosyncratic shocks F(x) = x; 8 x 2 [0;1]. It remains to determine the 9 following param-
eters:  m, i and 
j
i, with i 2 f0;1;2g and j 2 fS;Ng. By simplicity, the independent terms
of the search and disutility functions are set to 0 (0 = 
j
0 = 0), the slope parameters of
the search and the search disutility functions are set to 1 (1 = S
1 = 1), and the curvature
parameter N
2 (resp. N
2 ) of the search (resp. work) disutility function is set to 2 (resp. to
1) to have a quadratic (resp. linear) function.  m, 2 and N
1 are nally determined so as to
recover particular steady state values for the unemployment rate, the mean duration of the
unemployment spell, and the job destruction rate. As reproduced in table 2, the average
unemployment rate in the beginning of the 1990's was around 10% in the EU countries;
and is still at this level nowadays. In their model calibrated on Europe, Mortensen and Pis-
sarides [17] use an average unemployment spell duration of 9 months (instead of 3 months
in their calibration on US). We follow them and take an almost similar gure of 2.4 quarters
for the average unemployment spell duration. As shown in section 2, the average annual job
turnover is estimated to be in between 15% and 25% in the EU countries. Taking the mean
value (20%) leads to an annual job destruction rate of 10%18 and therefore a quarterly job
destruction rate of 2.5%. However, it is an underestimation because this gure does not
take into account the jobs created and destroyed within the year. Taking this into account,
we eventually set the job destruction rate 1 = 4%. All our calibration is summarized in
table 3. This calibration is robust in the sense that small changes in parameters do not
aect the qualitative results presented in the next section.
18At the steady state, the job creation is equal to the job destruction.
165 Simulations
In this section, we simulate our model under alternative scenarios, both at the steady state
and dynamically, to study the role of labor market institutions on the unemployment rate
and the job 
ows. The unemployment rate Ut is dened by equation (1). Using a uniform
idiosyncratic shock distribution (see the calibration section), we have the job destruction
rate JDt = R1






The job turnover JTt and the net employment change NETt are respectively the sum and
the dierence between these two rates:
JTt = JCRt + JDRt; (41)




5.1 Steady state eects
We shock our three institutional parameters (the unemployment benet wu, the lower bound
wm for the bargained wage and the ring tax f) and we focus on the long run eects on
the main variables and especially on the unemployment rate. The results are displayed in
table 4.
A 10% increase in the unemployment benet reduces the household's search eort, thereby
lengthening unemployment duration by 8.3%. This is in line with the result of Layard et
al. [13] according to which the elasticity of the unemployment duration to the unemployment
benet is estimated to be in between 0.2 and 0.9. By strenghtening the worker's bargaining
position, an increase in wu have a direct positive impact on the bargained wages. The
destruction rate and the average wage increase, unemployment rises and output falls. We
hence recover empirical and theoretical results showing a negative relationship between the
unemployment benet and the employment level. It is worth noting that a shock on the
unemployment benet aects new jobs and old jobs in a similar way.
A strengthening of the wage rigidities via a 10% increase in wm augments the job destruc-
tion rate and the fraction of workers paid at the lower bound wage. The average wage is
determined by the lower bound wage, the bargained wages and the job destruction rate,
17which also determines the fraction of workers paid at the minimum wage. The eect of wm
on the bargained wage is ambiguous. Through equation (30), we see there is a direct positive
eect (stronger bargaining position) but also an indirect negative eect due to the increase
in the critical productivity value Q (see equation (28)). The eects of wm on the job destruc-
tion rate and the fraction of workers paid at the minimum wage is however clearly positive
and, despite this ambiguous evolution of the bargained wage, the higher lower bound wage
and the higher job destruction rate are sucient to ensure a higher average wage. This is
strongly unfavorable to employment and output. These eects are similar for both new and
old jobs. Our model hence illustrates the adverse eects of wage rigidities on employment,
underlined by several empirical studies.
In Mortensen and Pissarides [17]'s model with complete wage 
exibility, job protection leads
to positive eects on employment. Indeed, an increase in the ring tax leads to lower job
destruction, but also lowers job creation and therefore increases the unemployment duration.
This, in turn, negatively aects the bargaining power of the worker and leads to a decrease
in the average wage. Altogether, employment is stimulated. We nd similar results with our
model. However, in our setting, due to the introduction of wage rigidities, the downward
wage adjustment is limited and hence the positive eect on employment. As shown in
table 4, a 10% increase in f reduces unemployment rate by only 0.7 percentage point. For
high levels of wage rigidities, the downward wage adjustment could even become too small
to compensate the negative impact on prots of the ring tax and the unemployment rate
could increase. We illustrate these interactions between f and wm in gure 1. We reproduce
the eects on the unemployment rate of a 10% increase in the ring tax, for dierent levels
for the lower bound wage. We see that the eect is negative for low wage rigidities, whereas
it becomes positive for high wage rigidities (see Cahuc and Zylberberg [7] for a similar
conclusion). However, whatever the level of wm, the eect of f on the unemployment rate
is quite small, which is in accordance with empirical results showing no real signicant
relationship between employment protection and employment.
As a conclusion, if both the unemployment benet and the wage rigidities may contribute
to a high unemployment rate, the quantitative eect of the latter is much larger. Moreover,
these rigidities are also important since they reduce the positive eects on employment of
the ring tax. With respect to the employment criterion, protecting employment seems
18therefore irrelevant in a country with high wage rigidities.
5.2 Cyclical properties
We checked in the previous section the eects of institutions on the unemployment rate. We
now focus on the eects of institutions on the cyclical properties of the job 
ows. We rst
examine the cyclical characteristics of the reference calibration and next look at the eects
of institutional changes. To dynamically simulate our model, we introduce an autocorrelated
aggregate productivity shock. In equation (34),  " is replaced by:








 is the coecient of autocorrelation and ut is drawn from a normal distribution
N(0;u). As in Den Haan et al. [10], we set 
 = 0:95 and we calibrate u = 0:03 in order
to have realistic volatilities for the job 
ows. We simulate our model during 10000 periods
and table 5 displays the main cyclical properties for the job 
ows.
The job 
ows are highly autocorrelated and, by calibration, their volatilities are similar
to those observed in table 1, even if the relative job destruction volatility may be some-
what too high for a European economy. We also obtain the job creation rate procyclicality
(with respect to the net employment change) and the job destruction rate countercyclicality
observed in the data. The job turnover is more acyclical, as seems to be the case in EU
countries.
In table 6, we vary our three institutional parameters (total variation of 20%) and we evaluate
their eects on the relative volatility of the job destruction rate and the cyclicality of the
job turnover. If unemployment benet has almost no eects on the cyclical properties,
more wage rigidities lead to a lower relative volatility of the job destruction and a less
countercyclical job turnover. This institutional feature may thus contribute to explain the
cyclical properties of EU labor market (see section 2). The eects of changes in wm on the
cyclical properties may work through both the job destruction rate and the job creation rate.
However, in our model with high employment protection, the eects of wm on the cyclical
properties of job destruction are weak. Most of the eects go through the job creation rate.
With complete wage 
exibility, the eects of aggregate productivity shock on job creation
would be partly oset by higher wages. With wage rigidities, the wage eect is weakened
19because most of the wages remain unchanged at the lower bound wage, the productivity
shock can fully positively aect the economy and the job creation eect is stronger than
without wage rigidities. This explains the lower relative job destruction volatility and less
countercyclical job turnover.
An increase in the ring tax (bottom part of table 6) increases the relative volatility of the job
destruction rate and the countercyclicality of the job turnover. Again, due to job protection,
all the eects of changes in f mainly aects the cyclical properties of the job creation
rate and not of the job destruction rate. Higher job protection decreases the volatility
of the job turnover and therefore the volatility of the job creation rate. As a result, the
relative volatility of the job destruction increases and the job turnover is more countercyclical
(relative eect of job destruction cyclicality more important).
Wage rigidities and employment protection thus have opposite eects; and job protection
does not seem to explain cyclical properties of a European labor market.
6 Conclusion
The aim of this paper is to study the role of labor market institutions on unemployment
rate and job 
ows cyclical properties. The respective eects on unemployment of the unem-
ployment benet and the ring cost have already been extensively studied (both empirically
and theoretically), but mainly in partial equilibrium market models. Moreover, the role of
downward wage rigidities is not so well known.
We construct a stochastic intertemporal general equilibrium model with search unemploy-
ment and endogenous job turnover and three labor market institutions: unemployment ben-
ets, a ring tax and a downward wage rigidity. We assume that wages are (re)negotiated at
each period of time (usual Nash bargaining) but we introduce an institutionally xed lower
bound on this wage bargaining outcome. The model is calibrated on a European economy
and simulated.
We obtain that high unemployment benet and, especially, high wage rigidities are able to
explain high unemployment. The eect of the ring tax on unemployment is more ambiguous
and depends on the level of wage rigidities. However, whatever its direction, this eect is
quite small. Focusing on job 
ows cyclical properties, we see that our model is able to
20reproduce the countercyclicality of the job destruction rate, the procyclicality of the job
creation rate and, as a result, the acyclicality of the job turnover. We moreover nd that the
wage rigidities and the ring tax have opposite eects on the job 
ows cyclical properties
and that it is the high wage rigidities that seems to explain the cyclical properties of a
European labor market.
Downward wage rigidities thus may well be apt to play a key role in explaining EU-US
dierences, both in terms of unemployment rate and cyclical properties. The result is in line
with available empirical results emphasizing the role of wage formation and stressing that
high employment is associated with low wage levels and high levels of wage inequality. Our
results are robusts in the sense that moderate changes in the calibration do not alter the
qualitative results. Naturally, such downward wage rigidities cannot be captured by a single
"minimum wage" parameter. The specication adopted here to introduce them remained
quite simple albeit sucient to make the point, and may serve as a starting point for future
developments.
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23Country JT NET (JC) (JD) (JD)=(JC) U
Belgium 15.2% 0.2% - - - 11.2%
France 24.4% 0.9% 1.7 0.9 0.53 9.9%
Germany 16.5% 1.5% 0.8 0.8 1.0 7.5%
Italy 21.0% 1.0% 1.2 0.9 0.7 9.3%
Netherlands 15.4% 1.0% - - - 7.7%
United States 18.6% 2.6% 2.0 3.0 1.5 6.8%
Yearly data. JT: job turnover, average 1984-1991 (may vary according to the country), source: OCDE [21],
table 5.1, p.163. NET: net employment change, average 1984-1991 (may vary according to the country), source:
OCDE [21], table 5.1, p.163. (JC): job creation standard deviation, average 1980's (may vary according to the
country), HP ltered, source: Boeri [5]. (JD): job destruction standard deviation, average 1980's (may vary
according to the country), HP ltered, source: Boeri [5]. U: unemployment rate, average 1983-1993, source:
OCDE [21], table 1.3, p.4.
Table 1: Job 
ows and unemployment: some facts
Country Repl. ratio EPL strictness Kaitz index Wage dispersion
Belgium 0.70 2.1 (13) 0.53 2.2
France 0.52 3.0 (21) 0.55 3.3
Germany 0.63 2.5 (18) - 2.3
Italy 0.13 3.3 (23) - 2.8
Netherlands 0.76 2.1 (14) 0.51 2.6
United States 0.32 0.2 (1) 0.35 4.4
Repl. ratio: synthetical net replacement ratio, 1999, source: OECD [24], table 3.10, p.41. EPL strictness: syn-
thetical index of the strictness of employment protection legislation and country ranking (between brackets), late
1990's, source: OCDE [23], table 2.5, p.66. Kaitz index: gross Kaitz index, mid-1997, source: OCDE [22], table
2.3, p.37. Wage dispersion: gross D9/D1 ratio, 1995 (may vary according the country), source: OCDE [21], table
3.1, p.62.
Table 2: Labor market institutions: some facts
24Symbol Value Symbol Value Symbol Value
Matching function
 m 0.60  0.4
Production function
 " 1  0.33
Search function






















Psychological discount and capital depreciation
 0.99  0.025
Table 3: Numerical parameter values
F JT U pop w
m U duration  w
benchmark 1.43 9.8% 10.5% 14.5% 2.4 1.03
w
u (+10%) -2.0% +2.1 +2.6 -1.0 +8.3% +0.5%
w
m (+10%) -4.0% +6.8 +6.9 +4.6 +5.7% +1.6%
f (+10%) +0.2% -1.3 -0.7 +0.6 +6.5% -0.3%
pop w
m: percentage of the workers paid at the lower bound wage. U duration: mean unemployment spell duration
(expressed in quarters).  w: mean wage.
Table 4: Long run eects of institutional shocks (deviations from the benchmark)










Figure 1: Eect on unemployment of a ring tax 10% increase, for dierent values of wm
JCt JDt JTt
AR(1) 0.88 0.69 0.89
 0.82 1.00 1.50
corr(:;NETt) 0.46 -0.68 -0.21
All series are HP ltered. AR(1): autocorrelation of order 1. : standard deviation. corr(:;NETt): correlation
with respect to net employment change.
Table 5: Cyclical properties of job 
ows in reference calibration
26w
u = 0.40 0.42 0.44 0.462 0.484
(JDt)=(JCt) 1.22 1.21 1.22 1.21 1.21
corr(JTt;NETt) -0.21 -0.21 -0.21 -0.20 -0.19
w
m = 0.54 0.57 0.60 0.63 0.66
(JDt)=(JCt) 1.28 1.26 1.22 1.18 1.12
corr(JTt;NETt) -0.27 -0.24 -0.21 -0.16 -0.12
f = 0.45 0.48 0.50 0.53 0.55
(JDt)=(JCt) 1.20 1.20 1.22 1.24 1.26
corr(JTt;NETt) -0.18 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.23
All series are HP ltered. : standard deviation. corr(:;NETt): correlation with respect to net employment
change.
Table 6: Sensitivity of cyclical properties to wu, wm and f
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